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Schriro v. Summerlin
124 S. Ct. 2519 (2004)
L Facts
On June 8, 1982, an Arizona jury convicted Warren Wesley Summerlin of
the April 1981 first-degree murder and sexual assault ofBrenna Bailey.' Pursuant
to Arizona's capital sentencing statutes, the trial judge conducted a hearing to
determine Summerlin's sentence.2 Finding that Summerlin had a prior violent
felony conviction and had committed "the offense in an especially heinous, cruel,
or depraved manner," the judge sentenced him to death.3 In 1983 the Supreme
Court of Arizona affirmed the conviction and death sentence.4
During Summerlin's final federal habeas corpus appeal in the United States
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, the United States Supreme Court decided
Apprendi v. New Jersy s and Ring v. AriZona.6 Relying on its determination in
1. Schriro v. Summerlin, 124 S. Ct. 2519, 2521 (2004); see ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-1105
(West 1978) (defining the elements of first-degree murder and setting the punishment at death or
life imprisonment); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §13-1406 (West 1978) (defining sexual assault); Charles
Lane, Higb Court to ClarijJudge-On4 Sentendng, WASH. POST, Apr. 19, 2004, at A4, available at 2004
WL 74480756 (giving the details of the procedural and factual history of Summerlin's cases). Bailey
had gone to the Summerlin house on business and did not return. Summern, 124 S. Ct. at 2521.
Later that evening, police received a telephone call from Summerlin's mother-in-law, who informed
them that Summerlin had killed Bailey and wrapped her in a carpet. Summerlin v. Stewart, 341 F.3d
1082,1084-85 (9th Cir. 2003). The mother-in-law based her information on her daughter's psychic
abilities. Id. at 1085. The next day, police found Bailey's partially nude body wrapped in
Summerlin's bedspread in the trunk of her car. Id
2. Summerin, 124 S. Ct. at 2521; see ARIZ. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13-703(B) (West 1978) (stating
that "[w]hen a defendant is found guilty of... first degree murder.., the judge who presided at
the trial ... shall conduct a separate sentencing hearing to determine the existence or nonexistence
of [aggravating and mitigating circumstances] for the purpose of determining the sentence to be
imposed").
3. Summer/in, 124 S. Ct. at 2521; see ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-703()(2) (defining as an
aggravator a previous conviction for a felony "involving the use or threat of violence on another
person"); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-703(F)(6) (stating as an aggravating circumstance that "[t]he
defendant committed the offense in an especially heinous, cruel, or depraved manner").
4. Summerin, 124 S. Ct. at 2521; see State v. Summerlin, 675 P.2d 686, 696 (Ariz. 1983)
(affirming the convictions and death sentence).
5. 530 U.S. 466 (2000).
6. Summer/in, 124 S. Ct. at 2521-22; see Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000)
(holding that a jury must find as an element of the crime any fact that can "increase[ I the penalty
... beyond the prescribed statutory maximum'); Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584,609 (2002) (holding
that "[b]ecause Arizona's enumerated aggravating factors operate as 'the functional equivalent of
an element of a greater offense,' the Sixth Amendment requires that they be found by a jury"
(quoting Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 494 n.19) (citation omitted)).
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Apprendi that" '[olther than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases
the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be
submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt,"' the Court in Ring
declared Arizona's capital sentencing scheme unconstitutional.7 Given the Ring
ruling, the Ninth Circuit vacated Summerlin's death sentence.' Arguing that the
Ninth Circuit erred in applying Ring retroactively to Summerlin's twenty-one-
year-old death sentence, the State of Arizona sought certiorari in the United
States Supreme Court.9
II. Holding
The United States Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit's grant of
sentencing relief, holding that Ring does not apply retroactively.' ° The Court
stated that while new substantive rules of criminal law will normally be applied
retroactively, Ring announced a new procedural rule and as such, was subject to
the general rule of non-retroactivity set forth in Teague v. Lane." The Court also
made clear that Ring does not fit the Teague exception as a" 'watershed rule[ I of
criminal procedure.' ,12 The Court therefore reversed the Ninth Circuit's
decision and remanded Summerlin's case for consideration of his other habeas
claims.' 3
III. Anaysis
The Summerin Court began by outlining its current doctrine concerning the
application of new Constitutional rules. 4 Under Gri~fth v. Kentucky," a court
must apply a newly announced rule to any case that is still pending on direct
appeal at the time the new rule is announced. 6 For convictions that have
7. Summerin, 124 S. Ct. at 2522 (quoting Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 490).
8. Id; see Summerfin, 341 F.3d at 1121 (reversing Summerlin's death sentence). For a
complete discussion and analysis of the Ninth Circuit's decision in Summerin, see generally Terrence
T. Egland, Case Note, 16 CAP. DEFJ. 319 (2003) (analyzing Summerlin v. Stewart, 341 F.3d 1082
(9th Cir. 2003)).
9. Summerin, 124 S. Ct. at 2522. The State also argued that the trial judge's finding of a prior
felony conviction exempted Summerlin's case from Apprndi and was sufficient to justify the death
sentence. Id. at 2522 n.3. The Supreme Court denied certiorari on this claim. Id.
10. Id. at 2526.
11. Id. at 2522-23; see Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 311 (1989) (defining the rule for
retroactive application of new Constitutional rules).
12. Summerin, 124 S. Ct. at 2524-26 (quoting Saffle v. Parks, 494 U.S. 494, 495 (1990)
(internal quotations omitted)).
13. Id at 2526.
14. Id. at 2522-23.
15. 479 U.S. 314 (1987).
16. Summerin, 124 S. Ct. at 2522; see Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314, 328 (1987) (holding
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become final following direct appeal in state court, the Court stated that under
Teague only new rules of substantive criminal law could normally be applied
retroactively. 7 The Court made clear that substantive rules are rules that either:
(1) "narrow the scope of a criminal statute by interpreting its terms"; (2) remove
a class of persons from the State's legal reach; or (3) "place particular conduct...
beyond the State's power to punish."'" The Court stated that these types of rules
must be applied retroactively because of the risk of punishing a person for an act
that is no longer a crime. 9 The reason for such retroactive application is to
prevent the conviction and punishment of the innocent.2'
The Court then explained the Teague rule that new procedural rules must not
be applied retroactively.2' To do so would undermine the legal system because
such rules "merely raise the possibility that someone convicted with use of the
invalidated procedure might have been acquitted otherwise."' Classifying this
possibility as a "more speculative connection to innocence," the Court explained
that only in rare cases would a procedural rule need to have a retroactive effect.'
The procedural exception to the Teague non-retroactivity rule, the Court stated,
would have to be a" 'watershed rule[ I of criminal procedure.' "" This type of
rule " 'implicat[es] the fundamental fairness and accuracy of the criminal
proceeding.' "25 According to the Court, even if the new procedural rule is
"fundamental," it should not be applied retroactively unless it " 'seriousy
diminishe[s]"' the accuracy of the outcome.26 The Court went on to distinguish
a procedural rule from a substantive rule by defining a procedural rule as one
"that regulate[s] only the manner of determining the defendant's culpability," in
contrast to one that changes the nature of the culpable act itself.27
The State of Arizona argued in its petition for certiorari that the Ninth
Circuit should not have applied Ring retroactively to vacate Summerlin's death
"that a new rule for the conduct of criminal prosecutions is to be applied retroactively to all cases,
state or federal, pending on direct review or not yet final").
17. Summer/in, 124 S. Ct. at 2522.
18. Id.; see Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614,620-21 (1998) (discussing the substantive
nature of a new rule that reinterprets a statute and thus changes the criminality of particular
conduct); Sale, 494 U.S. at 494-95 (discussing the type of new rule that eliminates classes of people
or conduct from within the State's power of punishment).
19. Summerin, 124 S. Ct. at 2522-23.
20. Id
21. Id at 2523.
22. Id.
23. Id
24. Id (quoting Saff/e, 494 U.S. at 495 (internal quotations omitted)).
25. Summer/n, 124 S. Ct. at 2523 (quoting Saffk, 494 U.S. at 495).




sentence because Ring created a new procedural rule.' Summerlin responded by
arguing that Ring was substantive because it recharacterized the aggravating
factors as elements of the crime that raised the maximum allowable penalty to
death. ' The Ninth Circuit agreed with this interpretation and concluded "that
Ring 'reposition[ed] Arizona's aggravating factors as elements of the separate
offense of capital murder.' "' By identifying aggravating circumstances as
essential elements of a newly defined crime of death-eligible murder, Summerlin
argued, Ring changed the substance of Arizona's death penalty law.3 Both
Summerlin and the Ninth Circuit further contended that Ring changed "our
understanding of Arizona law," thus making the rule substantive. 2
The Supreme Court rejected this interpretation and upheld the State's claim
that Ring announced a new procedural rule.33 Acknowledging that a rule that
"modifies the elements of an offense is normally substantive rather than proc-
edural," the Court nonetheless found that Ring did not actually change any
elements of Arizona's capital murder stature.' The Court stated that a defendant
in Arizona could be sentenced to death for the same conduct both before and
after Ring.35 The Court's ruling in Ring merely "altered the range of permissible
methods for determining whether a defendant's conduct is punishable by death."36
The Court also rejected Summerlin's second claim about the substantive nature
of the change, and pointed out that although "our understanding of state law
changed,... the actual content of state law did not."'37 The Court made clear that
it viewed the rule in Ring as merely procedural.3"
Summerlin also argued that if the Court found Ring to be procedural, then
it at least should consider it a "watershed" rule and uphold the Ninth Circuit's
retroactive application of it to his sentence.39 He claimed that the prior law
allowing the judge to find aggravating factors undermined the " 'fundamental
fairness and accuracy of the criminal proceeding,' " because "juries are more
accurate factfmders."' A jury, according to Summerlin, will produce a more
accurate conviction and sentence than a single judge because of the truth-seeking
28. Id at 2522.
29. Id at 2524.
30. Id (quoting Summerin, 341 F.3d at 1105).
31. Summer/in, 124 S. Ct. at 2524.
32. Id at 2524 n.5.
33. Id at 2523.
34. Id at 2524.
35. Id at 2523.
36. Id (emphasis added).
37. Summerin, 124 S. Ct. at 2524 n.5.
38. Id at 2523.
39. Id. at 2524.
40. Id (quoting Saffle, 494 U.S. at 495).
256 [Vol. 17:1
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power of group deliberation, "the jury's protection from exposure to
inadmissible evidence," and the fact that the jury more acutely represents the
community and its responsibility to punish only the worst of the worst with
death.41 The differences in accuracy and fairness between a judicial fact-finding
and one done by a jury in a capital sentencing proceeding, Summerlin claimed,
are precisely the kinds of differences for which the Court made the exception to
the Teague non-retroactivity rule.42
The Supreme Court rejected the proposition that Ring presented a
"watershed" rule.43 The Court did not answer the question of whether juries are
more accurate than judges, but instead focused on the question of "whether
judicial factfinding so 'seriousy diminishe[s]' accuracy that there is an 'imper-
missibly large risk' of punishing conduct the law does not reach."' The Court
decided that the evidence on the consistency of judicial, as opposed to jury, fact-
finding was "too equivocal" to conclude that "judicial factfmding seriousy
diminishes accuracy."4 The Court further found that its decision in DeStefano .
IWoods4 not to apply the Duncan v. Louisiana47 jury trial rule retro-actively supp-
orted its choice not to allow a retroactive application of Ring.4" The Court
consequently held that because Ring was a procedural rule that did not come
under the "watershed" exception of Teague, the Ninth Circuit erred in reversing
Summerlin's death sentence.49
Dissenting,Justice Breyer (oined byJustices Stevens, Souter, and Ginsburg)
critiqued the majority's classification of Ring as an unexceptional procedural
rule.' Conceding that Ring is a procedural, rather than a substantive, rule, the
dissent nonetheless found the rule to be of such importance as to qualify under
the "watershed" exception to Teague."' The dissent argued that "a death sentence
must reflect a community-based judgment that the sentence constitutes proper
retribution," and insisted that a jury necessarily better represents " 'the
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Summerin, 124 S. Ct. at 2525.
44. Id (quoting Teague, 489 U.S. at 312-13 (internal quotations omitted)).
45. Id
46. 392 U.S. 631 (1968).
47. 391 U.S. 145 (1968).
48. Summerin, 124 S. Ct. at 2525-26; see DeStefano v. Woods, 392 U.S. 631, 633-34 (1968)
(stating that the Court" 'would not assert... that every criminal trial... held before a judge alone
is unfair or that a defendant may never be as fairly treated by a judge as he would be by a jury' "
(quoting Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 158 (1968)); Duncan, 391 U.S. at 149 (holding that a
defendant's right to a jury trial in state criminal cases is the same as it would be in federal criminal
cases under the Sixth Amendment).





conscience of the community"' than does a judge acting alone.12 It noted Justice
Stevens's conclusion in his concurrence in Spa!Ziano v. Florida3 that "the right to
have jury sentencing in the capital context is both a fundamental aspect of
constitutional liberty and also significantly more likely to produce an accurate
assessment of whether death is the appropriate punishment."
' 4
The dissent made three arguments in favor of applying Ring retroactively."5
First, it pointed out that the death sentence is an expression of "community-
based value judgments."5' 6 It argued that a jury is essential to the determination
of death because the jury must use its "community-based standards, standards
that incorporate values," to define the aggravating terms---"especially heinous,"
"cruel," and "depraved"-that make a defendant death-eligible.5 7 The dissent
next noted that "Teague's retroactivity principles reflect the Court's effort to
balance competing considerations."' 8 Applying Ring retroactively would further
the purpose of the writ of habeas corpus to "protect[ I the innocent against err-
oneous conviction or punishment," a consideration especially important when
the punishment is as final and irrevocable as death. 9 Finally, the dissent argued
that a retroactive application of Ring would ensure that prisoners sentenced to
death have uniform constitutional sentencing procedures.'
It is worth noting that in its discussion of the accuracy of the judicial fact-
finder, the Summerin majority paid no heed to the actual fact-finder in
Summerlin's case. According to the Ninth Circuit's opinion, Judge Philip
Marquardt, who sentenced Summerlin to death, "was a heavy user of marijuana
at the time" of the sentencing.6 Indeed, Marquardt was later convicted in Texas
in 1988 for misdemeanor possession of marijuana, and in 1991, he attempted to
place the blame for an intercepted purchase of marijuana on his daughter's
boyfriend.62 The Supreme Court of Arizona eventually suspended Marquardt for
52. Id at 2527-29 (quoting Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 519 (1968)); see California
v. Ramos, 463 U.S. 992, 998-99 (1983) (stating that the "qualitative difference of death from all
other punishments requires a correspondingly greater degree of scrutiny of the capital sentencing
determination" than that given to other punishments).
53. 468 U.S. 447 (1984).
54. Summerfin, 124 S. Ct. at 2527 (citing Spaziano v. Plorida, 468 U.S. 447, 486-87 (1984)
(Stevens, J., concurring)).




59. Id at 2528-29.
60. Summerlin, 124 S. Ct. at 2529.
61. Summerlin, 341 F.3d at 1089.
62. Id. at 1089 n.1.
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his marijuana use, and the United States Supreme Court disbarred him in 1992.63
Although the Ninth Circuit stated that it could not be sure of the extent of
Marquardt's drug-use during Summerlin's trial and sentencing, it nonetheless
found that "[tihere [were] instances during pre-trial hearings and at trial when
Judge Marquardt exhibited confusion over facts that had just been presented[;]
... [hle also made some quite perplexing, if not unintelligible, statements at var-
ious times during the trial."'  One might argue that a drug-addicted judge who
appeared confused and unintelligible during trial should raise some serious
doubts as to the accuracy of the outcome and "produce [such] an 'impermissibly
large risk' of injustice" that the Court should be willing to consider Ring to be a
"watershed" rule.65
The circumstances of Summerlin's own history also call into question the
accuracy of his death sentence. Had a jury heard evidence of Summerlin's history
and mental condition, it might have decided that he was not culpable enough to
put to death. The Ninth Circuit opinion spelled out in great detail the circum-
stances of Summerlin's life that might have persuaded a jury to impose life
instead of death:
There is no doubt that Warren Summerlin is an extremely troubled
man. He has organic brain dysfunction, was described by a psych-
iatrist as "functionally retarded," and has explosive personality disorder
with impaired impulse control. His father was a convicted armed
robber who was killed in a shootout. As a youth, his alcoholic mother
beat him frequently and punished him by locking him in a room with
ammonia fumes. At his mother's behest, he received electroshock
treatments to control his explosive temper. He drop ed out of school
in the seventh grade due to dyslexia and comrnmittedl'numerous petty
juvenile offenses. In 1975, he was diagnosed as a paranoid schizo-
phrenic and treated with the anti-psychotic medication Thorazine.66
A group of individuals, reflective of the diversity of the community on whose
behalf they must impose sentence, might have given these arguably horrific
circumstances the kind of consideration that the potentially "drug-addled" judge
did not, perhaps even concluding that Summerlin's brain dysfunction and mental
health warranted a finding under Arizona Revised Statute section 13-703(G)(1)
that Summerlin's "capacity to appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct or to
conform his conduct to the requirements of law was significantly impaired.
6 7
The Supreme Court may have been too quick to ignore these circumstances in
63. Id.; see In re Disbarment of Marquardt, 503 U.S. 902, 902 (1992) (disbarring the judge).
64. Summer/in, 341 F.3d at 1090 n.2 .
65. Summerin, 124 S. Ct. at 2525 (quoting Teague, 489 U.S. at 312-13 (internal quotations
omitted)).
66. Summerin, 341 F.3d at 1084.
67. ARIZ. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13-703(G)(1) (West 1978).
2004]
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its finding that the fundamental fairness of Arizona sentencing proceedings was
not "seriously diminished" by the total absence of jury participation."
IV. Application in Virginia
Summerin's application in Virginia cases is limited. Ring did not affect
Virginia's capital murder and sentencing statutes because the statutes already
provide for a jury's finding beyond a reasonable doubt the aggravating factors
that make a defendant eligible for the death penalty.69 Summerin should, at least,
serve as a reminder to Virginia practitioners that the aggravating elements of
vileness and future dangerous are indeed elements of capital murder that the jury
must find beyond a reasonable doubt before it can choose to recommend a death
sentence, and that a defendant must know of the elements before trial so that he
or she may be prepared to defend against them.
V. Conclusion
Summern implicates the habeas corpus appeals of 110 people on death row
in Arizona, Colorado, Idaho, and Nebraska.7" The Court's fears about unending
litigation and deferment of finality seem unjustified in such a defined group of
cases. By limiting Ring to those cases not yet affirmed on direct appeal, the Sup-
reme Court has sanctioned the imposition of death in those cases under un-
constitutional procedures. If the death sentence is indeed a different kind of
punishment-a reflection of the community's desire to make a statement about
the worst of the worst-then it is ironic that the Court did not find it essential
to require that aggravating factors be found, and thus each death sentence be
imposed, by the representatives of the community, the jury. One should con-
sider that Summerlin raised his Ring claim long before the Supreme Court
decided Ring. Ring overruled Walton v. Arizona7' while Summerlin's case was still
pending, holding that aggravating factors were essential elements of the crime of
capital murder and needed to be found by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt.
72
Tamara L. Graham
68. Summerin, 124 S. Ct. at 2525.
69. See VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-264.2 (Michie 2004) (providing that a trier of fact cannot
impose a death sentence "unless [it] shall... find that there is a probability that the defendant
would commit criminal acts of violence that would constitute a continuing serious threat to society
or that his conduct in committing the offense... was outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible or
inhuman").
70. Summern, 124 S. Ct. at 2528, 2530.
71. 497 U.S. 639 (1990).
72. Ring, 536 U.S. at 609 (overruling Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639,649 (1990)); see Walton,
497 U.S. at 649 (rejecting Walton's argument thatArizona's capital sentencing scheme was unconsti-
tutional).
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